Abstract. We study the problem of integer factoring given implicit information of a special kind. The problem is as follows: let N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli of same bit-size, where q 1 , q 2 are α-bit primes. We are given the implicit information that p 1 and p 2 share t most significant bits. We present a novel and rigorous lattice-based method that leads to the factorization of N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time as soon as t ≥ 2α + 3. Subsequently, we heuristically generalize the method to k RSA moduli N i = p i q i where the p i 's all share t most significant bits (MSBs) and obtain an improved bound on t that converges to t ≥ α + 3.55 . . . as k tends to infinity. We study also the case where the k factors p i 's share t contiguous bits in the middle and find a bound that converges to 2α + 3 when k tends to infinity. This paper extends the work of May and Ritzenhofen in [9] , where similar results were obtained when the p i 's share least significant bits (LSBs). In [15] , Sarkar and Maitra describe an alternative but heuristic method for only two RSA moduli, when the p i 's share LSBs and/or MSBs, or bits in the middle. In the case of shared MSBs or bits in the middle and two RSA moduli, they get better experimental results in some cases, but we use much lower (at least 23 times lower) lattice dimensions and so we obtain a great speedup (at least 10 3 faster). Our results rely on the following surprisingly simple algebraic relation in which the shared MSBs of p 1 and p 2 cancel out: q 1 N 2 − q 2 N 1 = q 1 q 2 (p 2 − p 1 ). This relation allows us to build a lattice whose shortest vector yields the factorization of the N i 's.
Introduction
Efficient factorization of large integers is one of the most fundamental problem of Algorithmic Number Theory, and has fascinated mathematicians for centuries. It has been particularly intensively studied over the past 35 years, all the more that efficient factorization leads immediately to an attack of the RSA Cryptosystem. In the 1970's, the first general-purpose sub-exponential algorithm for factoring was developed by Morrison and Brillhart in [11] (improving a method described for the first time in [7] ), using continued fraction techniques. Several faster general-purpose algorithms have been proposed over the past years, the most recent and efficient being the general number field sieve (GNFS) [8] , proposed in 1993. It is not known whether factoring integers can be done in polynomial time on a classical Turing machine. On quantum machines, Shor's algorithm [16] allows polynomial-time factoring of integers. However, it is still an open question whether a capable-enough quantum computer can be built.
At the same time, the problem of factoring integers given additional information about their factors has been studied since 1985. In [14] , Rivest and Shamir showed that N = pq of bit-size n and with balanced factors (log 2 (p) ≈ log 2 (q) ≈ n 2 ) can be factored in polynomial time as soon as we have access to an oracle that returns the n 3 most significant bits (MSBs) of p. Beyond its theoretical interest, the motivation behind this is mostly of cryptographic nature. In fact, during an attack of an RSAencrypted exchange, the cryptanalyst may have access to additional information beyond the RSA public parameters (e, N), that may be gained for instance through side-channel attacks revealing some of the bits of the secret factors. Besides, some variations of the RSA Cryptosystem purposely leak some of the secret bits (for instance, [17] ). In 1996, Rivest and Shamir's results were improved in [2] by Coppersmith applying lattice-based methods to the problem of finding small integer roots of bivariate integer polynomials (the now so-called Coppersmith's method). It requires only half of the most significant bits of p to be known to the cryptanalyst (that is n 4 ). In PKC 2009, May and Ritzenhofen [9] significantly reduced the power of the oracle. Given an RSA modulus N 1 = p 1 q 1 , they allow the oracle to output a new and different RSA modulus N 2 = p 2 q 2 such that p 1 and p 2 share at least t least significant bits (LSBs). Note that the additional information here is only implicit: the attacker does not know the actual value of the t least significant bits of the p i 's, he only knows that p 1 and p 2 share them. In the rest of the paper, we will refer to this problem as the problem of implicit factoring. When q 1 and q 2 are α-bit primes, May and Ritzenhofen's latticebased method rigorously finds in quadratic time the factorization of N 1 and N 2 when t ≥ 2α + 3. Besides, their technique heuristically generalizes to k − 1 oracle queries that give access to k different RSA moduli N i = p i q i with all the p i 's sharing t least significant bits. With k − 1 queries the bound on t improves to: t ≥ k k−1 α. Note that these results are of interest for unbalanced RSA moduli: for instance, if N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 are 1000-bit RSA moduli and the q i 's are 200-bit primes, knowing that p 1 and p 2 share at least 403 least significant bits out of 800 is enough to factorize N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time. Note also that the method absolutely requires that the shared bits be the least significant ones. They finally apply their method to factorize k n-bit balanced RSA moduli N i = p i q i under some conditions and with an additional exhaustive search of 2 Very recently, in [15] , Sarkar and Maitra applied Coppersmith and Gröbner-basis techniques on the problem of implicit factoring, and improved heuristically the bounds in some of the cases. Contrary to [9] , their method applies when either (or both) LSBs or MSBs of p 1 , p 2 are shared (or when bits in the middle are shared). Namely, in the case of shared LSBs they obtain better theoretical bounds on t than [9] as soon as α ≥ 0.266n. Besides, their experiments often perform better than their theoretical bounds, and they improve in practice the bound on t of [9] when α ≥ 0.21n. Note finally that their bounds are very similar in the two cases of shared MSBs and shared LSBs. Readers interested in getting their precise bounds may refer to their paper [15] .
Unfortunately, Sarkar and Maitra's method is heuristic even in the case of two RSA moduli, and does not generalize to k ≥ 3 RSA moduli. In fact, when the p i 's share MSBs and/or LSBs, their method consists in building a polynomial f 1 in three variables, whose roots are (q 2 + 1, q 1 ,
, where γ is the number of shared LSBs between p 1 and p 2 . That is,
represents the part of p 1 − p 2 where the shared bits do not cancel out. To find the integer roots of f 1 , they use the Coppersmith-like technique of [5] which consists in computing two (or more) new polynomials f 2 , f 3 , . . . sharing the same roots as f 1 . If the variety defined by f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , . . . is 0-dimensional, then the roots can be easily recovered computing resultants or Gröbner basis. However, with an input polynomial with more than two variables, the method is heuristic: there is no guarantee for the polynomials f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , . . . to define a 0-dimensional variety. We reproduced the results of Sarkar and Maitra and we observed that f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , . . . almost never defined a 0-dimensional variety. They observed however that it was possible to recover the roots of the polynomials directly by looking at the coefficients of the polynomials in the Gröbner basis of the ideal generated by the f i 's, even when the ideal was of positive dimension. The assumption on which their work relies is that it will always be possible. For instance, in the case of shared MSBs between p 1 and p 2 , they found in their experiments that the Gröbner basis contained a polynomial multiple of x − q 2 q 1 y − 1 whose coefficients lead immediately to the factorization of N 1 and N 2 . They support their assumption by experimental data: in most cases their experiments perform better than their theoretical bounds. It seems nevertheless that their assumption is not fully understood.
Our contribution consists of a novel and rigorous lattice-based method that address the implicit factoring problem when p 1 and p 2 share most significant bits. That is, we obtained an analog of May and Ritzenhofen's results for shared MSBs, and our method is rigorous contrary to the work of Sarkar and Maitra in [15] . Namely, let N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli of same bit-size n. If q 1 , q 2 are α-bit primes and p 1 , p 2 share t most significant bits, our method provably factorizes N 1 and N 2 as soon as t ≥ 2α + 3 (which is the same as the bound on t for least significant bits in [9] ). This is the first rigorous bound on t when p 1 and p 2 share most significant bits. From this method, we deduce a new heuristic lattice-based for the case when p 1 and p 2 share t bits in the middle. Moreover, contrary to [15] , these methods heuristically generalize to an arbitrary number k of RSA moduli and do not depend on the position of the shared bits in the middle, allowing us to factorize k RSA moduli as soon as t ≥ k k−1 α + 6 (resp. t ≥ 2k k−1 α + 7) most significant bits (resp. bits in the middle) are shared between the p i 's (more precise bounds are stated later in this paper). A summary of the comparison of our method with the methods in [9] and [15] can be found in table 1.
Let's give the main idea of our method with 2 RSA moduli in the case of shared MSB's. Consider the lattice L spanned by the row vectors v 1 and v 2 of the following matrix: When p 1 , p 2 share either t LSBs or MSBs: heuristic bound better than t ≥ 2α + 3 when α ≥ 0.266n, and experimentally better when α ≥ 0.21n. In the case of t shared bits in the middle, better bound than t ≥ 4α + 7 but depending on the position of the shared bits. Using 46-dimensional lattices of Z 46
When p 1 , p 2 share t MSBs: rigorous bound of t ≥ 2α +3 using 2-dimensional lattices of Z 3 . In the case of t bits shared in the middle: heuristic bound of t ≥ 4α + 7 using 3-dimensional lattices of Z 3 .
When the p i 's all share t LSBs:
Cannot be directly applied.
When the p i 's all share t MSBs (resp. bits in the middle): heuristic bound of t ≥
Consider also the following vector in L:
The key observation is that the t shared significant bits of p 1 and p 2 cancel out in the algebraic relation q 1 N 2 − q 2 N 1 = q 1 q 2 (p 2 − p 1 ). Furthermore, we choose K in order to force the coefficients of a shortest vector of L on the basis (v 1 , v 2 ) to be of the order of 2 α ≈ q 1 ≈ q 2 . We prove in the next section that v 0 is indeed a shortest vector of L (thus N 1 and N 2 can be factored in polynomial time) as soon as t ≥ 2α + 3. Besides, we generalized this construction to an arbitrary number of k RSA moduli such that a small vector of the lattice harnesses the same algebraic relation, and to shared middle bits. However, the generalized constructions in both cases become heuristic: we use the Gaussian heuristic to find a condition on t for this vector to be a shortest of the lattice. Applications of implicit factoring have not yet been extensively studied, and we believe that they will develop. The introduction of [9] gives some ideas for possible applications. They include destructive applications with malicious manipulation of public key generators, as well as possibly constructive ones. Indeed, our work shows that when t ≥ 2α + 3, it is as hard to factorize N 1 = p 1 q 1 , as generating N 2 = p 2 q 2 with p 2 sharing t most significant bits with p 1 . This problem could form the basis of a cryptographic primitive.
Throughout this paper, we heavily use common results on euclidean lattice. A summary of these results can be found in appendix A. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our rigorous method in the case of shared MSB's and two RSA moduli, we generalize it to k RSA moduli in section 3. In section 4, we present our method in the case of shared bits in the middle. Finally, in section 5 we present our experiments that strongly support the assumption we made in the case of k RSA moduli and of shared middle bits.
Implicit Factoring of Two RSA Moduli with Shared MSBs
In this section, we study the problem of factoring two n-bit RSA moduli: N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 , where q 1 and q 2 are α-bit primes, given only the implicit hint that p 1 and p 2 share t most significant bits (MSBs) that are unknown to us. We will show that N 1 and N 2 can be factored in quadratic time as soon as t ≥ 2α + 3. By saying that the primes p 1 , p 2 of maximal bit-size n − α + 1 share t MSBs, we really mean that
Let's consider the lattice L spanned by the row vectors (denoted by v 1 and v 2 ) of the following matrix:
We have the following immediate lemma that makes our method work:
Note that the shared MSBs of p 1 and p 2 cancel each other out in the difference p 2 − p 1 . Each of the coefficients of v 0 are thus integers of roughly (n+α −t) bits. Provided that t is sufficiently large, ±v 0 may be a shortest vector of L that can be found using Lagrange reduction on L. Moreover, note that as soon as we retrieve v 0 from L, factoring N 1 and N 2 is easily done by dividing the first two coordinates of v 0 by K (which can be done in quadratic time in n). Proving that v 0 is a shortest vector of L under some conditions on t is therefore sufficient to factorize N 1 and N 2 .
We first give an intuition on the bound on t that we can expect, and we give after that a proof that ±v 0 is indeed the shortest vector of L under a similar condition.
The volume of L is the square root of the determinant of the Gramian matrix of L given by
be approximated by 2 2n−t because K 2 ≈ 2 2(n−t) is small compared to the N 2 i ≈ 2 2n . The norm of v 0 is approximately 2 n+α−t , because each of its coefficients have roughly n+α −t bits. If v 0 is a shortest vector of L, it must be smaller than the Minkowski bound applied to L:
, which happens when t ≥ 2α. The following lemma affirms that v 0 is indeed a shortest vector of L under a similar condition on t.
Lemma 2. Let L be the lattice generated by the row vectors v 1 and v 2 of M and let
as defined in Lemma 1. The vector ±v 0 is the shortest vector of the lattice L as soon as t ≥ 2α + 3.
Proof. Let (b 1 , b 2 ) be the resulting basis from the Lagrange reduction on L. This reduced basis verifies
, and, by Hadamard's inequality one have:
. Moreover, if v 0 is strictly shorter that b 2 , v 0 is a multiple of b 1 ; for otherwise b 2 would not be the second minimum of the lattice. In this case, v 0 = ab 1 = a(bv 1 + cv 2 ), a, b, c ∈ Z, and looking at the first two coefficients of v 0 , we get that ab = q 1 and ac = q 2 . Since the q i 's are prime, we conclude that a = ±1, that is, v 0 = ±b 1 . Using the previous inequality, a condition for v 0 to be strictly shorter than
Let's upper-bound the norm of v 0 and lower-bound Vol(L). We first provide simple bounds that proves the lemma when t ≥ 2α + 4 and derive secondly tighter bounds that require only t ≥ 2α + 3.
The p i 's have at most n − α + 1 bits, and they share their t most significant bits so |p 2 − p 1 | ≤ 2 n−α+1−t . We thus have the inequality v 0
We can lower-bound the volume of L, using that
Using inequalities (2) and (3), the inequality (1) is true provided that: 2 2(n+α−t)+3 ≤ 2 2n−t− 1 2 which is equivalent to (as t and α are an integers):
We have thus proved the lemma under condition (4) . We now refine the bounds on v 0 and Vol(L) in order to prove the tight case. The integers q 1 and q 2 are α-bit primes, therefore
The p i 's have at most n − α + 1 bits and they share t bits, so (p 2 − p 1 ) 2 ≤ 2 2(n−α+1−t) . Thus, using the upper-bound on the q 2 i , we have
We can finally bound v 0 (5) and (6):
Let's now define ε 2 by the equality 2 n−t+1/2 − 1 = 2 n−t+1/2−ε 2 . We have that K = 2 n−t+ 1 2 ≥ 2 n−t+1/2−ε 2 and N 2 i ≥ 2 2n−2 , we can therefore lower-bound Vol(L) 2 :
Using the inequalities (7) and (8), the condition (1) is true under the new condition 2 2(n+α−t)+3−ε 1 ≤ 2 2n−t−ε 2 which is equivalent to t ≥ 2α + 3 + ε 2 − ε 1 . Since ε 1 = log 2 (
) and α ≤ n − t, we have ε 2 ≤ ε 1 and the result follows.
From the preceding Lemmas 1 and 2, one can deduce the following result. Remark 1. For our analysis, the value K = 2 n−t+ 1 2 is indeed the best possible value. If we use K = 2 n−t+γ , we obtain the bound t ≥ 2α + f (γ) with f (γ) = 3 2 − γ + log 2 (2 + 2 2γ ). The minimum of f is 3 and is attained in γ = 
Implicit Factoring of k RSA Moduli with Shared MSBs
The construction of the lattice for 2 RSA moduli naturally generalizes to an arbitrary number k of moduli. Similarly, we show that a short vector v 0 of the lattice allows us to recover the factorization of the N i 's. This vector takes advantage of the relations q i N j − q j N i = q i q j (p j − p i ) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. However, we were unable to prove that v 0 is a shortest vector of the lattice. Therefore, our method relies on the Gaussian heuristic to estimate the conditions under which v 0 should be a shortest vector of the lattice. Experimental data in section 5 confirms that this heuristic is valid in nearly all the cases.
In this section, we are given k RSA moduli of n bits N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k where the q i 's are α-bit primes and the p i 's are primes that all share t most significant bits.
Let us construct a matrix M whose row vectors will form a basis of a lattice L; this matrix will have k rows and k + To make things more concrete, consider the example of k = 4. Up to a reordering of the columns (that changes nothing to the upcoming analysis),
Notice that the columns k + 1 to k + m correspond to all the 2-subsets of {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Similarly to the case of 2 RSA moduli (lemma 1), L contains a short vector that allows us to factorize all the N i 's: Remark that v 0 is short because its m last coordinates harness the cancellation of the t most significant bits between the p i 's. Retrieving ±v 0 from L leads immediately to the factorization of all the N i 's, dividing its first k coordinates by K. This assumption is supported by experimental data in the section 5. We found it to be almost always true in practice. This condition can be seen as an analog of condition 1 of section 2 in the case of two RSA moduli.
Let's derive a bound on t so that v 0 is smaller than the Gaussian heuristic applied to L. The norm of v 0 can be computed and upper-bounded easily:
Computing the volume of L is a bit more involved, we refer to Lemma 5 of appendix B:
and thus Vol(L) ≥ 2 n−t √ k2 n−1
We now seek the condition on t for the norm of v 0 to be smaller than the Gaussian heuristic. Using the two previous inequalities on v 0 and Vol(L), we get the stricter condition:
Expanding everything and extracting t, we get the following condition:
When k ≥ 3, we can derive a simpler and stricter bound on t: t ≥ k k−1 α + 6 Finally, as ±v 0 is now the shortest vector of L under Assumption 1, it can be found in time C (k, where C (k, s, B) is the time to find a shortest vector of a kdimensional lattice of Z s given by B-bit basis vectors. We just proved the following theorem: Theorem 2. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k be k n-bit RSA moduli, with the q i 's being α-bit primes, and the p i 's being primes that all share t most significant bits. Under Assumption 1, the N i 's can be factored in time C (k,
as soon as t verifies equation (10).
Remark 2. Note that we can find a shortest vector of the lattice of Theorem 2 using Kannan's algorithm (Theorem 6 in appendix A) in time O(P(n, k) k k 2e +o(k) ) where P is a polynomial. It implies that we can factorize all N 1 , . . . , N k in time polynomial in n as soon as k is constant or k k is a polynomial in n. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, this algorithm is not implemented in the computer algebra system Magma [1] on which we implemented the methods. In our experiments, to compute a shortest vector of the lattice, we used instead the Schnorr-Euchner's enumeration algorithm which is well known (see [4, 3] ) to perform well beyond small dimension (≤ 50) and this step in Magma took less than 1 minute for k ≤ 40. One may also reduce the lattice using LLL algorithm instead of Schnorr-Euchner's enumeraion. If t is not too close to the bound of Theorem 2, the Gaussian heuristic suggests that the gap (see Definition 1 in the appendix) of the lattice is large, and thus LLL may be able to find a shortest vector of L even in medium dimension .
Similarly to the case of 2 RSA moduli, K = 2 n−t+ 1 2 is optimal for our analysis. Indeed, if we redo the analysis with K = 2 n−t+γ , we find that the optimal value for γ is the one that minimizes the function f k = γ → 
Implicit Factoring with Shared Bits in the Middle
In this section, we are given k RSA moduli of n bits N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k where the q i 's are α-bit primes and the p i 's are primes that all share t bits from position t 1 to t 2 = t 1 + t. More precisely, these RSA moduli all verify:
where p is the integer part shared by all the moduli. Contrary to the LSB case presented in [9] and the MSB one developed in the previous sections, the method we present here is heuristic even when k = 2. We sketch now our method when k = 2 and present the details on the general result later. When k = 2, we have a system of two equations in four variables p 1 , q 1 , p 2 , q 2 :
Similarly to the LSB's case (see [9] ), this system can be reduced modulo 2 t 2 . One obtains a system of two equations with 5 variables p, p 1 0 , p 2 0 , q 1 , q 2 :
The problem can now be seen as a modular implicit factorization of N 1 and N 2 with shared MSBs. Thus, we adapt the method we proposed in section 2 to the modular case. More precisely, we consider the lattice L defined by the rows of the matrix
Let v 0 be the vector (q 1 K, q 2 K, r) with r being the unique remainder of
As in the section 3, we search for a condition on the integer t under which ±v 0 is the shortest vector in L under Assumption 1 (here, the dimension of the lattice L is 3). The integer K will be set at the end of the analysis.
We have v 0
Thanks to the uppertriangular shape of M, the volume of L is easily computed: Vol L = K 2 2 t 2 . Thus, we can respectively upper-bound and lower-bound v 0 2 and Vol L by 2 2α+1 K 2 + 2 2t 1 +4α and K 2 2 t 2 ; a condition on t so that v 0 is smaller than the Gaussian heuristic follows: and the integer value of K which minimizes the right-hand of this inequality is K = 2 α+t 1 . Hence, under Assumption 1, one can factorize N 1 , N 2 in polynomial-time as soon as
A stricter and simpler condition on t is: t ≥ 4α + 7.
We now inspect when Assumption 1 is not verified, that is we study the possible existence of exceptional short vectors in L that are smaller than v 0 . These vectors may appear when there exists small coefficients c 1 , c 2 (< 2 α ) such that c 1 N 1 −c 2 N 2 mod 2 t 2 is small (say ≈ 2 t 2 −γ ). In particular, to make easier the analysis, we examine the case when the simple vector v 1 defined with c 1 = c 2 = 1 is smaller than v 0 . The inequality v 1 2 < v 0 2 is equivalent to t − γ < 2α. So this inequality is possible only for small t and large γ which can be considered as an exception. In our experiments, these exceptional shorts vectors (and, in particular, simple vectors v 1 ) almost never appear in the k = 2 case with t verifying the bound 13.
The method for k ≥ 3 is a straightforward generalization of the k = 2 case by using the results of section 3. Let's consider the lattice L defined by the rows of the matrix M given by
where C m is the matrix defined in section 3 and formed by the concatenation of m = k 2 column vectors of k rows and I k×k (resp. I m×m ) is the identity matrix of size k × k (resp. m × m). Thus, M is a square upper triangular matrix of size (m + k) × (m + k) and the volume of the r (a,b) , . . . 
, is clearly a vector of L. As we do above, we search for a condition on the integer t under which ±v 0 is the shortest vector in L under Assumption 1. The integer K will be set at the end of the analysis to be optimal. We have v 0
, that we can bound by v 0 2 ≤ k2 2α K 2 + m2 2t 1 +4α . A condition on t, under Assumption 1, follows:
This condition is equivalent to
The value of K which minimizes the right-hand of this inequality is given by the zero of the derivative of the function K → k2
m+k . Actually, K is given by the solution of the equation
and thus, after simplification, K = 2 α+t 1 which is an integer value. A general condition on t becomes
and the general result immediately follows.
. . , N k = p k q k be k n-bit RSA moduli, where the q i 's are α-bit primes and the p i 's are primes that all share t bits from the position t 1 to t 2 = t 1 + t. Under Assumption 1, the N i 's can be factored in time C (
2 , n), as soon as
As in the case of k = 2, we inspect the general case k ≥ 3 for the existence of exceptional vectors v 1 = (c 1 K, . . . , c k K, . . . , c i N i − c j N j mod 2 t 2 , . . .) which will disprove Assumption 1, that is, with c i 's (< 2 α ) and c i N i − c jN j mod 2 t 2 small (say ≈ 2 t 2 −γ ). The condition under which the simple vector v 1 with c 1 = c 2 = · · · = c k = 1 verify v 1 2 < v 0 2 is given by
Thus, as in the case of k = 2, for t and α small and γ large enough, this type of simple vectors may appear. Moreover, the degree of liberty for choosing the c i increases with k, thus, exceptional vectors may appear more frequently when k grows. This fact was observed during our experiments.
Remark 3. During our first experiments, in few cases, our method fails to factor the N i 's. After analysis of the random generation functions used in our code, it turns out that the q i where randomly generated in the interval 2 α−1 , 2 α . Thus, the probability that a lot of q i 's have exactly size α is high. If, moreover, α is small enough compared to t 2 (α < t 2 = t +t 1 ), the corresponding N i −N j mod 2 t 2 may be very small. This could be explained by the following fact: some of the most significant bits (and at least the highest bit) of N i mod 2 t 2 and N j mod 2 t 2 will be a part of the shared bits between the p i 's and thus they cancel themselves in (N i − N j ) mod 2 t 2 . Hence, in this case, we have an exceptional short vector in L and our method fails; on the other hand, if one use these moduli then an attacker may use this extra information to easily factor them with another method. In order to check the validity of Assumption 1 and the quality of our bounds on t, we implemented the methods on Magma 2.15 [1] .
Experimental results

Shared MSBs
We generated many random 1024-bit RSA moduli, for various values of α and t. We observed that the results were similar for other values of n. In the case where k = 2, we used the Lagrange reduction to find with certainty a shortest vector of the lattice, and for 3 ≤ k ≤ 40 we compared Schnorr-Euchner's algorithm (that provably outputs a shortest vector of the lattice) with LLL (that gives an exponential approximation of a shortest vector). We used only LLL for k = 80.
We conducted experiments for k = 2, 3, 10, 40 and 80, and for several values for α. For specific values of k, α and t, we said that a test was successful when the first vector of the reduced basis of the lattice was of the form ±v 0 (that is, it satisfies Assumption 1 in the heuristic case k ≥ 3). For each k and each α, we generated 100 tests and found experimentally the best (lowest) value of t that had 100% success rate. We compared this experimental value to the bounds we obtained in Theorems 2 and 1. For the first value of t that does not have 100% success rate and for k ≥ 3, we analyzed the rate of failures due to Assumption 1 not being valid. Note that failures can be of two different kinds: the first possibility is that v 0 is greater than the Gaussian heuristic, and the second one is that v 0 is smaller than the Gaussian heuristic yet v 0 is not a shortest vector of the lattice (that is, Assumption 1 does not hold). We wrote down the percentage of the cases where Assumption 1 was not valid among all the cases where v 0 was smaller than the Gaussian heuristic. These results are shown in tables 2 and 3. Let's take an ex- ample. For k = 10 and α = 200 (second line of the part corresponding to k = 10 in table 3), Theorem 2 predicts that v 0 is a shortest vector of the lattice as soon as t ≥ 227. It turned out that it was always the case as soon as t ≥ 225, which is better than expected. For t = 224, Assumption 1 was not valid in 3% of the cases. Let's analyze the results now. In the rigorous case k = 2, we observe that the attack consistently goes one bit further with 100% success rate than our bound in Theorem 1.
In all our experiments concerning the heuristic cases k ≥ 3, we observed that we had 100% success rate (thus, Assumption 1 was always true) when t was within the bound (10) of Theorem 2. That means that Theorem 2 was always true in our experiments. Moreover, we were often able to go a few bits (up to 3) beyond the theoretical bound on t. When the success rate was not 100% (that is, beyond our experimental bounds on t), we found that Assumption 1 was not true in a very limited number of the cases (less than 3%). Finally, up to dimension 80, LLL was always sufficient to find v 0 when t was within the bound of Theorem 2, and Schnorr-Euchner's algorithm allowed us to go one bit further than LLL in dimension 40.
Shared bits in the middle
Contrary to the case of shared MSBs, Assumption 1 may fail when we apply our method with shared bits in the middle (see section 4). When k = 2 the phenomenon of exceptional short vectors rarely appeared when t was within the bound of Theorem 3 (less than 1% of failure and did not depend on the position t 1 , moreover, we were generally allowed to go 2 or 3 bits further with 90% of success). When k ≥ 3 it was not still the case. When Schnorr-Euchner's algorithm did not return v 0 , we tried to find it in a reduced basis computed by LLL. If neither of these algorithms was able to find v 0 then our method failed. The table 4 shows the result of our experiments for k = 5 RSA moduli of size n = 1024 and q i 's of size α ∈ {100, 99} (see Remark 3). As one can see, our method can be successfully applied in this case. During these experiments, the failure rate of our method was equal to the failure rate of finding v 0 in a reduced basis computed by LLL. More generally, our experiments showed that for the same size of problems the rate of success is approximately 80% when t was within the bound of Theorem 3 and allowed us to go one or two bits further with success rate ≈50%.
Efficiency comparisons
Additionally, we show in table 5 the lowest value of t with 100% success rate and the running-time of LLL and Schnorr-Euchner's algorithm for several values of k (k RSA moduli with p i 's factors sharing t MSBs). For each k, we show the worst running-time we encountered when running 10 tests on an Intel Xeon E5420 at 2.5Ghz. We see that all individual tests completed in less than 1 second for 2 ≤ k ≤ 20. We used SchnorrEuchner's algorithm up to k = 60 where it took at most 6200 seconds. LLL completes under one minute for 20 ≤ k ≤ 40 and in less than 30 minutes for 40 ≤ k ≤ 80. 
Conclusion
In this article we have studied the problem of integers factorization with implicit hints. We have presented new lattice based methods in order to factorize k ≥ 2 RSA moduli N i = p i q i with polynomial complexity in log(N i ) when p i 's share unknown MSBs or contiguous bits in the middle. In the case k = 2 and shared MSBs, our method is the first one to be completely rigorous. These new results can be seen as an extension of the ones presented in [9] and [15] where, respectively, May and Ritzenhofen gave same type of results in the case where the p i 's share LSBs and Sarkar and Maitra presented heuristic methods based on the Coppersmith's algorithm for finding small roots of polynomials for k = 2 moduli with shared MSBs (and/or LSBs) or bits in the middle . Our method gives comparable theoretical results as the one of May and Ritzenhofen and it is more efficient than the Sarkar and Maitra's method. Whether the method can be applied for k ≥ 3 N i 's RSA moduli with p i 's sharing MSBs and LSBs remains an open issue. In this case, the problem has much more variables and our method can not be directly applied. One possible way to follow for attacking this problem is to use algebraic techniques, in particular elimination theory, jointly with lattice based methods. This would be an interesting focus for future research.
